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DIVISIONAL REPORTING AND THE
INSURANCE COMPANY
EXEMPTION
ADAM M. DUNCAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is a long-standing rubric of federal securities regulation that the
public investor must be afforded the fullest possible disclosure of all per-
tinent and material facts.' That philosophical tradition is evident in the
new regulations and forms2 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The new regulations affect a broad spectrum of companies, including
those having securities traded over-the-counter and which are subject to the
Exchange Act.3 Companies which are exempted 4 from the provisions of
the Exchange Act 5 are not, however, directly affected by the new reporting
regulations. Companies operating in the multi-billion dollar insurance in-
dustry are the most significant exemption.6 The extent to which the insur-
ance company exemption is "conditional" will be examined hereinafter.
Basically, the regulations declare that, whatever the corporate struc-
ture, when a business enterprise conducts two or more operations, the suc-
cess of each being more or less independent of the other, the public investor
is not adequately informed as to the company's prospects and performance
* LL.B., University of Utah, 1953. Member, American Bar Association Standing Com-
mittee on Federal Regulation of Securities; Member of Utah Bar.
I "Disclosure is and has from the outset been a central aspect of national policy
in the field of securities regulation." SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '55 AND '34 ACTS 10 (CCH ed. 1969) [herein-
after cited as THE WHEAT REPORT]. See also 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 122-28 (2d
ed. 1961).
2 See I CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7123, at 6202; 7192, at 6313 (1969); 2 CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 27,303, at 21,303; 28,402-405, at 21,502-511 (1969).
a Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)
(1964).
448 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2) (1964).
548 Stat. 892, 894-96 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78m, 78n, 78p (Supp.
IV, 1969).
648 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964). The subsection (G)
exemption does not exempt insurance companies whose securities are listed on a national
securities exchange. However, very few insurance company securities are listed. See note 25
infra and accompanying text. Subsection (G) does not exempt insurance companies from
the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964), when the company undertakes a public offering of its securities
in interstate commerce. The impact of the subsection (G) exemption is with respect to
disclosure by insurance companies to the millions of existing shareholders and the public
who purchase outstanding shares of insurance companies on the over-the-counter market.
Improvement of investor protections in this area of the securities market place was a
principal purpose of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964. See notes 21 and 22 infra
and accompanying text.
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unless there is available to him the material information on each division
or operation. In such companies consolidated reporting, particularly of
financial operations, may in reality obfuscate more than disclose. The busi-
ness of insurance companies fits precisely into this pattern. Yet, by reason
of their exemption, the financial information which experience has estab-
lished is essential to informed investment judgment, and which now will
be available as to most companies, need not be provided by insurance com-
panies to their shareholders or the public investor. This vast loophole in
the investor protections provided by the federal securities laws is no longer
(if, in truth, it ever was) tolerable.
INSURANCE Is BIG BUSINESS7
On December 31, 1968, the assets of life insurance companies in the
United States amounted to $188.6 billion,8 an increase of $10.8 billion dur-
ing the year 9 as a result of the addition of $9.9 billion in "new" funds and
a net increase of $898 million "in valuation of assets previously held."'10 Of
this enormous sum, approximately 30 percent was held by shareholder-
owned insurance companiek" 1 These assets were invested in diverse se-
curities. 12
The Institute of Life Insurance further reports:
Growth in the number of life insurance companies in the United States
has been rapid since the end of World War 11. At the end of 1945, there
were 473 U.S. legal reserve companies in operation; by mid-1968, the
number had nearly quadrupled, to 1,761. By the end of 1968, the number
had reached an estimated 1,775.
From the beginning of 1950 to the middle of 1968, a total of 2,084 com-
panies were added to the list of life insurance companies in business. The
great majority of these were newly-formed companies ...
. .Of the 1,761 companies in business at mid-year 1968, 1,605 or more
than nine-tenths, were owned by stockholders. 13
Additionally, by the end of 1966, 792 stock, property and liability insurers
in the United States possessed assets of $31 billion.' 4 During 1968, these
companies wrote nearly $9 billion in premiums. 15
7 Insurance companies are of two types, viz., mutual companies having no share-
holders, and stock companies with equity ownership. This article is limited to consid-
eration of shareholder-owned companies.
8 BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, LIFE-HEALTH vii (1969).
9 Id.
10 INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 65 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 LIFE INS. FACT BOOK].
11 ld. at 104.
12d. at 65-68.
13 Id. at 102-04.
14 A. MOWBRAy, INSURANCE 444 (6th ed. 1969).
15 Best, the industry statistical authority, reports that property liability insurers
wrote $6,886,701,000 in premiums during 1968. BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS, PROPERTY-
LIABILITY xiv (1969).
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Considered in the context of a discussion of the new SEC financial re-
porting requirements and the needs which they were framed to meet, the
insurance company exemption appears as an anachronistic anomaly.
THE INSURANCE COMPANY EXEMPTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
From 186916 insurance companies had enjoyed a constitutional im-
munity from Congress' "commerce clause" powers. However, in 1944 the
Supreme Court decided United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters As-
sociation,17 an antitrust case, which held that Congress did not intend to
exclude insurance companies from the provisions of the Sherman Act. Con-
gress reacted quickly by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act,'8 which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance .... 19
Subsequently, in 1961,20 Congress directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission to conduct an investigation of the adequacy of investor pro-
tection under the existing securities laws. The Commission undertook the
study and in 1963 presented its Special Study Report to Congress. 21 The
Report recommended legislation which would extend proxy rule, insider
trading and "registration" (the filing of certain information and periodical
reporting of certain material information) requirements to a large number
of companies which had theretofore been outside the provisions of much
of the Exchange Act. All companies having securities traded over-the-
counter, with 750 or more shareholders (reduced to 500 on and after July
1, 1966) and more than $1 million in assets were encompassed within the
proposed legislation.22 The recommendations of the Special Study Report
were embodied in Senate Bill 1642.2
3
The Commission presented devastating arguments for the inclusion in
the proposed legislation of shareholder-owned insurance companies. 24 The
Commission found that almost all insurance company stock was traded over-
the-counter and therefore was not and is not subject to the rigorous dis-
16 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
17 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
1859 Stat. 83 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
19 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964).
20 75 Stat. 465 (1961), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (Supp. IV, 1962).
21 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT].
22 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 3, at 62-64.
21 S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, (1963). "A Bill to amend the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, to extend disclosure
requirements to the issuers of additional publicly traded securities, to provide for im-
proved qualification and disciplinary procedures for registered brokers and dealers."
24 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 3, at 40-42.
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closure requirements applicable to exchange-listed securities. 25 Moreover,
a large percentage of the insurance companies which the Commission exam-
ined had outstanding stock with a market value of $10 million or more.26
The Commission further reasoned:
[I]nvestors in insurance companies are no different from those of other
types of issuers in the investor-oriented protections they need. There
is really nothing at all about State regulation of insurance companies -
any more than about State regulation of public utility companies, for
example - that differentiates these companies from all others in respect
of the need for protection of investors as such.
The need for protection of investors in insurance stocks has been estab-
lished. . . . State regulation of insurance companies, however thorough-
going and salutary it may be, is not designed to protect investors; . ... 2
The proposed inclusion of insurance companies was vigorously resisted by
powerful industry spokesmen.2 8 Nonetheless, Senate Bill 1642 passed the
Senate on July 30, 1963, without an exemption for insurance companies. 29
Thereafter, the industry associations, and particularly the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),30 obviously concerned by
their failure to convince the Senate to exempt insurance companies, adopted
a new approach in their lobbying efforts.31 The arguments presented to
the House were much more conciliatory, and much more candid than those
presented by the industry spokesmen to the Senate committee. The House
Report concluded:
This committee amendment [exempting insurance companies] was adopted
following testimony by a number of State insurance commissioners and
representatives of stock insurance companies who unanimously opposed
the subjecting of these insurance companies to the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in addition to the jurisdictions of the
various State commissioners .... The basic objection advanced by these
witnesses went not to the requirements for the protection of investors for
disclosure but only to the jurisdictional question.
The State insurance commissioners through their organization, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, testified that they recognized some
25 Id., pt. 2, at 547.
26 Id., pt. 2, at 551.
27 Id., pt. 3, at 41-42.
28 Hearings on S. 1642, Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 228-41, 268-77 (1963). The Association of Casualty & Surety
Companies and National Board of Fire Underwriters, id. at 228, American Life Conven-
tion, Life Insurance Association of America and Life Insurers Conference, id. at 268,
National Association of Life Companies, Inc., id. at 275, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, id. at 277, were among the organizations opposing the inclusion of stock-
holder-owned insurance companies within the proposed legislation.
2978 Stat. 565 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964).
30 For a discussion and history of the NAIC, see Murphy, The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners in EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 47-56 (A. Straub ed.
1953).
31 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 514-23
(1964) [hereinafter cited as PROCEDINGS].
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validity to the contention in the commission's special study report that
their procedures were primarily directed to matters concerning the protec-
tion of policyholders and to the need for some improvement in these pro-
cedures insofar as they relate to the protection of investors in the stock of
these companies.
The thrust of the testimony by these representatives of the State insurance
commissioners was that they be given an opportunity to demonstrate their
ability effectively to protect the investors as well as the policyholders. The
committee amendment gives these State commissioners this opportunity to
do so.32
Based on the representations and assurances of the NAIC,33 a "condi-
tional"3 4 exemption for insurance companies was included by the House
in the Securities Acts Amendments Act and remained in the Bill as it be-
came law on August 20, 1964. 3 5
THE SECTION 12 "CONDITIONAL" EXEMPTON
The exemption, not quite a total rejection of the Commission's recom-
mendations, was made expressly contingent upon the insurance companies
32 H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1964).
33 A key argument of the NAIC to the House Committee was that:
An NAIC Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stafford Grady, insurance
commission for California has recently developed also a "stockholders" infor-
mation supplement which will become an integral part of the basic form for
1964 and later years.
id.
It is illustrative of the power of the insurance industry lobbyists, and particularly
the NAIC spokesmen, that they were able to convince the Congress to accept their assur-
ance that this "stockholders' information supplement" would answer all of the Com-
mission's well-made arguments for fuller investor disclosure, even though the House
Committee apparently did not even have a copy or draft of the proposed form.
34 See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 210. The Commission's position that the
insurance company exemption is "conditional only" is fully supported by the language
of the exemption itself and the Report of the House Committee which adopted the
amendment. The statement and clear qualification (warning?) that the amendment gives
the state commissioners the "opportunity" to demonstrate their ability to protect effec-
tively the investors is most significant. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
3548 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2) (1964):
The provisions of this subsection [regulating insider trading and proxy solic-
itation and requiring "registration'"] shall not apply in respect of - ..
(G) any security issued by an insurance company if all of the following con-
ditions are met.
(i) Such insurance company is required to and does file an annual statement
with the Commissioner of Insurance (or other officer or agency performing a
similar function) of its domiciliary State, and such annual statement conforms to
that prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners or in the
determination of such State commissioner, officer or agency substantially con-
forms to that so prescribed.
(ii) Such insurance company is subject to regulation by its domiciliary State of
proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of securities issued by such com-
pany and such regulation conforms to that prescribed by the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners.
(iii) After July 1, 1966, the purchase and sales of securities issued by such insur-
ance company by beneficial owners, directors, or officers of such company are
subject to regulation (including reporting) by its domiciliary State substantially
in the manner provided in section 78p of this title.
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being subject to proxy regulation in such form as the NAIC should pro-
vide.36 In addition, it required that after July 1, 1966, insider trading be
subjected to regulation by the domiciliary state "substantially in the man-
ner" provided in the Exchange Act.3 7 Thereafter, the NAIC proposed its
"Stockholder Information Supplement, Schedule SIS '38 as its device for
proxy regulation, and each state adopted some type of insider trading law,
thereby providing, to some degree, the investor protections the Commission
had recommended to be included in the statute.
The conditions of the exemption made no provision at all for fuller
disclosure to investors other than the fatuous requirement that the exempt
company must file an NAIC annual statement 39 - at that time already a
requirement in every state and a document which the Commission had
persuasively contended was unintelligible to the average investor. 40 The
entire exemption fails if the insider trading provisions of the domiciliary
state are determined not to be "substantially" the same as those in the
Exchange Act. 41 In June, 1964, the NAIC approved a model insider trading
statute and urged its adoption by the legislature of each state.42 The NAIC-
proposed statute follows closely the provisions of section 16 of the Exchange
Act.43 The Exchange Act, however, applies to "any class of any equity
security" while the state statute applies to "any class of stock." Unless the
36 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G)(ii)(1964). Subsection (ii) does not specify a single guide-
line or direction. The form and manner of state proxy regulation was left completely to
the discretion of the NAIC - the very group which had so doggedly contended that exist-
ing state regulation was fully adequate and which had so vigorously resisted any change
whatsoever. This unprecedented and inexcusable abdication of Congressional responsi-
bility virtually assured that the exemption would create at least as many problems and
uncertainties as it might resolve. See, e.g., notes 46, 47, 50 infra and accompanying text.
In a 1966 publication of the Subcommittee of the Public Regulation of the Business
of Insurance Committee of the Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law
of the American Bar Association, it was observed:
It may not be desirable or feasible for an insurer to absorb another insurer
through statutory merger or consolidation . . . [because of] technical obstacles
to statutory amalgamation .... [Furthermore] there is wide variation among the
states ... [as to] alternative procedures .. . [to outright merger].
ABA, MERGER OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 175 (1966).
Clearly subsection (ii) did not produce uniformity among the states, and the differing
laws of the several states still provide "alternative procedures" which enable the transfer
of control of an insurance company without the burden of the "technical obstacles" of
state insurance law and regulations.
37 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G)(iii) (1964).
as The form, known as the "SIS" (for "Stockholders' Information Supplement"), was
in fact adopted by the NAIC and each state commissioner. A copy first appears in print
as an addendum to the NAIC meeting on June 8, 1964 (nearly 13 months after the
Senate had passed the bill with no insurance company exemption and just days before
the House hearings). See PROCEEDINGS at 517-20. By 1969, every state had adopted some
form of regulation of insurance company proxies. See THE WHEAT REPORT at 211.
39 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G)(i) (1964).
40 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 3, at 40.
41 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G)(ii) (1964).
42 PROCEEDINGS at 514-23.
43 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
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"equity security" coverage is "substantially" the same as "stock" coverage,
the entire exemption may not be available. 44
The net result of the insurance company exemption in the Securities
Acts Amendments Act of 1964 was to increase, not lessen, the complexity
of securities regulation of insurance companies, and to create a three-tiered
regulatory structure - state, NAIC and federal. Overlooked, perhaps, in the
states' rights arguments of the insurance industry for state regulation of
their securities transactions, is the fact that insurance companies still remain
subject to all anti-fraud provisions of the federal acts.45
SEC v. National Securities
An action brought by the Commission and culminating in an opinion
by the United States Supreme Court in 1969 points up the confusion and
inadequacy of the present system of regulation.
In 1966, the Commission challenged the adequacy of the protection
accorded insurance company shareholders by seeking an injunction against
a proposed insurance company merger which had been approved by the
State Insurance Commission.46 The Commission contended that the proxy
materials, notwithstanding their approval by the Arizona insurance com-
missioner, were fraudulent and that, under the provisions of section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and SEC rule lOb-5, the federal court possessed suf-
ficient power to issue an injunction. The insurance companies convinced
the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals47 that by reason
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act48 the federal courts had no jurisdiction. The
merits of whether the proxy solicitation was, in fact, fraudulent, were
44 At first and superficial glance, "stock" (per the state statute) would appear to be
more, not less, inclusive than "equity security" (per the Exchange Act). The NAIC model
state statute does not define "stock"; nor does the Exchange Act. But the Exchange Act
defines "equity security" very broadly:
The term "equity security" means any stock or similar security; or any security
convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying any
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant
or right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to be of sim-
ilar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations
as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
treat as an equity security.
48 Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(l1) (1964).
It would seem that convertible securities, such as convertible debentures, options and
warrants, are all subject to the federal insider trading provisions and not to the state
statute. If so, is this a "substantial" difference in the two statutes?
45 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964); Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (a) 1964); SEC rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). See generally A.
BRtOMBER, SacuRiTs LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 (1970). See also Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (D. Ind. 1968), 259 F. Supp. 673 (D. Ind.
1966).
46 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 623 (D. Ariz. 1966).
47 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967).
4859 Stat. 33-34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(b) (1964).
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never reached. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 49 and reversed. 50 The
majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Marshall, seeks to limit the scope
of the decision, but while not expressly nullifying the McCarran-Ferguson
Act as applicable to securities transactions, the Court's definition of a "secu-
rities transaction" as distinguished from "the business of insurance" reaches
very much the same result. The decisions reached in SEC v. United Benefit
Life Insurance Co.51 and SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of
America,52 where variable annuity insurance contracts were held to be sub-
ject to federal securities laws as being, in essence, "securities" as distin-
guished from "insurance," 53 foreshadowed the result in National Securities.
Insurance company spokesmen presented arguments in 1963 and 1964
that state regulation could and would provide investor protection sub-
stantially equivalent to that of federal regulation, if the states were given
the opportunity to do so.5" The National Securities case, in microcosm, illus-
trates that the "opportunity" Congress extended has clearly not been met.
EVERY INSURANCE COMPANY CONDUCTS Two DISTINCT BUSINESS OPERATIONS
Insurance is, as the industry rightly contends, a unique enterprise
which is highly regulated by the states. 55 But in important respects - im-
portant from the standpoint of the shareholder and public investor - an
insurance company has much in common with other businesses which op-
erate on other people's money.56 And the need to provide meaningful and
understandable financial information to the public investor is every bit as
significant in the insurance industry as it is in other industries which op-
erate two or more diverse businesses.
49 390 U.S. 1023 (1968).
50 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The case has been the subject of a number of notes. See, e.g.,
17 AM. U.L. REv. 554 (1969); 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1024 (1969); 20 SYRAcUsE L.
REV. 811 (1969); 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1238 (1969); 22 VAND. L. REv. 680 (1969).
51 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
52 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
53 Section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 exempts from registration:
[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like func-
tions, or any State or Territory of the United States or t he District of Columbia.
48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1964).
54 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., 19 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 69 (1965); 2 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 431-598 (2d ed. 1959), Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of
State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective,
56 MICH. L. REv. 545 (1958).
Life insurance companies evidently find the state regulation in Arizona most con-
genial. From 1951 to 1961, the number domiciled in Arizona increased from 4 to 116.
See SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 3, at 41-42. This number more than doubled from
1961 to 1969; by the end of 1968, Arizona had the largest number of domestic insurance
companies (279) in the nation. See 1969 LIFE INS. FAcT BOOK at 103-04. The National
Securities case was a challenge to the Arizona regulation. See notes 46, 47, 49 supra and
accompanying text.
56 L. BRANDEIS, OTHJER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914).
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Every insurance company conducts business in two distinct fields which
are, essentially, quite independent of each other, viz., underwriting of risks
and investment of assets. 57 Underwriting -that is, the assumption of spe-
cified risks upon issuance (or writing) of insurance policies or contracts - is
the source of a substantial part of the income and profit (or loss) of every in-
surance company. Every insurance company also operates a securities invest-
ment business - a business wholly unrelated to its underwriting business,
and one very similar to that of mutual funds and other investment com-
panies. Yet, while the operations of investment companies are meticulously
regulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act, 58 on the other
hand, the investment practices of insurance companies are not. This me-
ticulous regulation of investment companies does not supplant, but is addi-
tional to, regulation under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
An insurance company may, and often does, operate its underwriting
business at a loss, while investing its assets at a profit. The expertise, talent
and managerial skills involved in underwriting are totally different from
those necessary to the successful management of an investment portfolio.
A number of factors are important to an insurance company's under-
writing business. The experience, training and performance of the agency
force; the persistency59 of the policies written; the ratio of acquisition costs
to profitability of insurance written; the ratio of new business to renewals
- all are elements which must be carefully considered in any evaluation
of an insurance company. Entirely different factors determine the success
(or failure) of an insurance company's investment business. Every state reg-
ulates the types and amounts of securities which may be purchased by
insurance companies. These regulations are detailed. Nonetheless, the selec-
tion of a particular common stock, mortgage, bond, loan or other invest-
ment within the statutory categories, is entirely discretionary with
management. 60 The skill and experience of those insurance company of-
ficials charged with managing investments are vital considerations to an
57 Best's Insurance Reports lists and rates both life and accident and health com-
panies and property and liability companies separately by underwriting performance and
investment performance. See notes 8 & 15 supra.
58 The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1964).
In section 1 of the Act, Congress expressed its "Findings and declaration of policy."
Many of the reasons stated, from which Congress found that investment companies are
"affected with a national public interest," appear equally true of and applicable to in-
surance companies. Insurance companies fall squarely within the definition of an "invest-
ment company," particularly as defined by subsection (3) of section 3(a), 54 Stat. 797
(1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1964).
59 Rates of voluntary termination of policies by policyholders vary considerably
among life insurance companies. Each company's rate is influenced by many fac-
tors, including the types of policies written and the ratio of new policies to older
ones in force with the company.
1969 Lira INS. FAcr BOOK 52.
00 "There are considerable differences from company to company in the way life
insurance assets are invested...." Id. at 65.
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insurance company shareholder or investor. Evaluation by the public share-
holder or investor of these two distinct business operations of an insurance
company poses informational problems no different than those which are
encountered in evaluating a non-insurance company operating two distinct
businesses.
THE CONVENTION STATEMENT AND SCHEDULE SIS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE
INFORMATION
The Commission's new regulations will make available information
from which the shareholder or investor can make an informed and balanced
judgment as to the success and profitability of each division, business or
product-line of most companies. Comparable information is just not avail-
able to shareholders and investors in insurance companies.
The insurance industry argues that such information is available; that
the annual "convention" statement, which every insurance company must
file with the insurance commissioner of each state in which it engages in
business contains this information. These annual statements "re public
records and are, as the industry contends, indeed detailed. But the crucial
question is whether these annual convention statements of insurance com-
panies provide the shareholder and investor, in meaningful and under-
standable form, substantially the same information as the new regulations
will elicit from non-insurance companies. Any analysis of the annual con-
vention statement must answer that they do not.
The Annual Statement of Insurance Companies is a printed form copy-
righted annually by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.61
The convention blank was reframed by the NAIC in 1951.62 With minor
changes, the 1951 form has been adopted by every state insurance commis-
sioner and is in use today. Yet the NAIC does not list among its objectives
the protection of insurance company investors, 63 and the convention blank
reflects this limitation.
The Commission observed that the convention statement "was designed
for regulatory purposes and not for the information of investors . . .[and]
is complex and detailed, and its interpretation requires the skills of a spe-
cialized financial analyst.164
In a recently published text on insurance company accounting, the
author, himself an actuary, acknowledges:
61 See R. NOBACK, LIFE INSURANcE ACCOUNTING 311-39 (1969).
62 Id. at 6-8.
63 The object of this Association shall be to promote uniformity in legislation
affecting insurance, to encourage uniformity in departmental rulings under the
insurance laws of the several states, to disseminate information of value to insur-
ance supervisory officials in the performance of their duties, to establish ways
and means of fully protecting the interests of insurance policyholders of the
various states, terntories and insular possessions of the United States and to
preserve to the several states the regulation of the business of insurance.
NAIC CONST. & BYLAWS art. 2 (1963).
64 THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 213.
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[T]o understand the financial statements, one should be familiar with
the principles of both actuarial science and the accounting discipline, with
the functions performed by life insurance companies, with the provisions
of the contracts issued by them and with the requirements imposed by the
Association Blank .... 65
A number of items on the annual convention statement are uniquely
"insuranceze" and virtually meaningless to one not privy to the esoteric
usages. "Provision for experience rating refunds"; " 'Cost of Collection' on
premiums and annuity considerations deferred and uncollected in excess
of total loading thereon"; "Mandatory securities valuation reserve" - are
all on the balance sheet. Aside from the complexities of the data called for,
the form itself is physically formidable: 45 form pages, and when completed,
often running to hundreds of pages, printed in the unwieldly size of 11 2"
by 18V". Clearly, this statement was not conceived for purposes of pro-
viding readable, understandable or meaningful information to the investor.
In 1964, the NAIC, obviously in response to the pending federal legisla-
tion, promulgated an additional form known as the "Stockholders Infor-
mation Supplement (Schedule SIS)."66 In marked contrast to the convention
blank, Schedule SIS is brief, just five pages, half of which merely contain
instructions. 67 Schedule SIS is nothing more than a series of interrogatories,
supplementing the interrogatories in the convention blank, concerning the
information supplied during the previous year and to be supplied during
the coming year by the insurance company to its stockholders. The infor-
mation which Schedule SIS suggests be included in the annual statement
mailed to stockholders is modest.
Life insurance and accident and health companies must supply "a.
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, Surplus and Other Funds; b. Summary of
Operations; c. Surplus Account." Fire and Casualty Companies must pro-
vide "a. Statement of Assets, Liabilities, Surplus and Other Funds; b. State-
ment of Income - Underwriting and Investment Exhibit; c. Capital and
Surplus Account." The companies must also include remuneration and se-
curities ownership of officers. The detail (or lack of it), the form, and
whatever else is disclosed or not disclosed to the insurance company share-
holders, are left entirely to the discretion of insurance company manage-
ment. The schedule permits, even invites, the presentation of "operations"
in such a way as to obscure underwriting losses by offsetting them with
investment profits in a consolidated statement.
65 R. NOBACK, supra note 61, at 3. The spokesman for the Association of Casualty
& Surety Companies and National Board of Fire Underwriters had a "let-them-eat-cake"
answer:
If an interested investor is in any way puzzled by insurance company accounting
methods, he can readily receive an analysis from one of the investment houses
specializing in insurance stocks, and these analyses furnish such information in
terms of SEC accounting procedures.
HEARINGS, supra note 28, at 231.
66 PROCEDINGS, supra note 31, at 514-16.
67 Id. at 517-20.
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Schedule SIS was a step, albeit a small one, toward providing more
information to insurance company shareholders. But no one can contend
that it provides information "substantially equivalent" to that which would
be available to insurance company stockholders if insurance companies
were not exempted from section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Furthermore,
if an insurance company discloses no more material facts than are required
by Schedule SIS in connection with a sale or purchase of securities, or a
merger, it may well incur extensive civil liabilities. 68
The Commission remains dubious about the adequacy of insurance
company information available to the public investor. The Commission
study group recently proposed a "Rule 164 Qualified List"6 9 which would
permit public sale and trading of securities of certain companies without
registration where adequate information about these companies is available
to the public. Insurance companies are to be excluded from the proposed
list because disclosure is not adequate.70
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
I am not one who believes that federal regulation is the answer to
every business problem; far from it. But the states have utterly failed in
the five-year "opportunity" period which they requested to advance any
68 See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (D. Ind. 1968), 259 F. Supp. 673 (D. Ind. 1966).
SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970), reads in pertinent part: "It shall be
unlawful . .. to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact .. .in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Rule lOb-5 has
been the basis of a proliferation of recent cases. See generally A. BROatBERG, supra note 45.
A number of lOb-5 cases have turned on the meaning of "material." Obviously, what
is "material" in one factual matrix may not be so in another. Perhaps, the best definition,
because of its being conformable to any set of facts, is that given by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965):
The basic test of "materiality" . . . is whether "a reasonable man would attach
importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action in
the transaction in question." Restatement, Torts § 538(2)(a)...
However broadly or narrowly the test of materiality is drawn, there can be no doubt
that the Convention Statement and Schedule SIS omit a considerable number of extremely
material facts and, further, that the facts as presented are so incomprehensible as to be
misleading.
69 THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 206-15.
70 [T]he Study estimates that there are at least 465 insurance companies with
over 100 stockholders and at least 120 insurance companies with over 500 share-
holders which are not subject to either the reporting or proxy requirements of
the '34 Act.
The annual financial information filed by such companies with state au-
thorities (the convention statement) was designed for regulatory purposes and not
for the information of investors. It is complex and detailed, and its interpreta-
tion requires the skills of a specialized financial analyst,
Id. at 212-13.
At least one commentator believes insurance companies should be included in the
exempted list. See Throop, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee Comments on
the Wheat Report, 25 Bus. LAw. 39, 44-45 (1969).
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significant improvement in protection for insurance company shareholders.
Despite all the falderal about NAIC and state regulation being "substan-
tially equivalent" to federal regulation, the only real protection and re-
course available to the insurance company shareholder is provided by the
federal anti-fraud laws.71
The need is real. The number of shareholder-owned insurance com-
panies is sharply increasing, 2 while mergers of shareholder-owned insurance
companies are also occurring more frequently.73 Yet, one can survey the
possible remedial courses only with considerable pessimism. There is the
possibility, certainly the best course, that Congress will simply do what it
should have done in 1964 and bring insurance companies under the Ex-
change Act by repealing the section 12(g)(2)(G) exemption. However, there
is no reason to believe that the same powerful interests which opposed the
1964 Act would not again resist the inclusion of insurance companies. The
proven clout of the insurance company lobbyists raises considerable doubt
as to the possibility of legislative remedy.
Another possibility, which could prove to be a model of state and in-
dustry self-discipline, would be for the states, through the NAIC, to adopt
meaningful investor-directed regulation. The NAIC has within its consid-
erable authority the power to promulgate uniform state regulations re-
quiring insurance companies to provide to their shareholders and make
available to the public, in meaningful and understandable language, every
material fact about those companies having publicly-traded securities.
However, the NAIC is not and does not profess to be, an investor-
oriented association; nor has it ever shown any desire to regulate in the
interest of the shareholder or investor. It was only with the extreme reluc-
tance and under the spur of impending federal legislation that it acknowl-
edged, in 1964, that the Commission's arguments for further investor
protections had any merit at all. The implementation by the NAIC of the
section (G) conditions was, predictably, the least possible within the stat-
utory limits. There is no reason to believe that the Association, like the
leopard, will, or even can, change its spots.
Either of the foregoing possibilities is desirable; neither appears likely.
Almost certainly, the resolution will be left to the federal courts. The
Commission or private litigants may well seek judicial determination of
whether state insider trading laws meet the test of the section 12(g)(2)(G)(iii)
condition. A court ruling that the state regulation was not "substantially
in the manner" provided in the Exchange Act would nullify the entire
exemption and bring insurance companies under the Act. A proliferation
71 E.g., SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1970).
72 See SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 3, at 40-42; 1969 LIFE INS. FACT BOOK 102-03.
73 See 1969 LIFE INS. FACT BOOK 102-03.
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of civil suits in the Brennan and National Securities74 genre appears possi-
ble, even probable. It is certain, however, that the millions of insurance
company shareholders and the public investor should no longer tolerate
state regulation which provides neither meaningful information nor ade-
quate protections.
74 See also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (D. Ind.
1968), 259 F. Supp. 673 (D. Ind. 1966).
